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What Happened?
There is general consensus that the only
predictable characteristic of influenza vi-
ruses and pandemics is their unpredict-
ability [1]. Given such uncertainty, rea-
sonable application of the precautionary
principle should prevail in the responses.
Indeed many of the initial responses to the
2009 pandemic went well. Once isolated,
the pandemic virus strain was shared
immediately, specific diagnostic assays
were produced and distributed worldwide,
antivirals were available in many coun-
tries, vaccine development started prompt-
ly, and clinical trials demonstrating vac-
cine safety and immunogenicity were
conducted rapidly.
There were many inherently favourable
features of the pandemic itself, not all of
which were immediately apparent (Table 1).
This was not 1918 Spanish flu. The impact
has been mostly confined to the health
sector. But that impact has been significant
and heterogeneous, with pressure experi-
enced by primary and hospital care (espe-
cially intensive care and paediatric services).
Distilling descriptions of the impact of a
complex public health threat like a pandem-
ic into a single term like ‘‘mild,’’ ‘‘moder-
ate,’’ or ‘‘severe’’ can potentially be mislead-
ing [2]. Certainly the experience of hospital
clinicians indicated that this pandemic,
sometimes described as ‘‘mild to moderate,’’
was not limited to only mild or moderate
illness. Many patients were severely ill and
died, and undoubtedly, high-quality clinical
management of patients with severe com-
plications in intensive care units saved many
lives of the critically ill, who often required
prolonged hospitalisation [3].
The epidemiology of this pandemic is
different than for seasonal influenza epi-
demics, but not unlike previous pandemics.
Young people have been disproportionate-
ly affected in terms of hospitalisation and
deaths compared to seasonal influenza in
which complications and mortality are
predominantly borne by the elderly [4].
Similarly, the risk to pregnant women has
been higher than for seasonal influenza
[5,6], which was also noted in previous
pandemics. The attributable premature
mortality may remain unclear for some
time. Recent American analyses have
estimated many more deaths than those
officially reported with laboratory confir-
mation of infection and that years of life lost
were equivalent to the 1968 pandemic. The
lower bound of such estimates is equivalent
to the annual burden caused by a typical
H3N2 seasonal epidemic in temperate
climates [7,8]. The years-of-life-lost metric
captures the impact of a different age-
specific mortality pattern which death
counts cannot. Deaths involving the young
and healthy incur many more potential
years of life lost compared to those of older
adults and of chronically ill individuals.
There are also a number of ‘‘firsts’’ for
the 2009 pandemic after an interpandemic
period of more than four decades (Box 1).
These brought both opportunities and
challenges. Under the auspices of the
World Health Organization (WHO), the
process of a global review by public health
specialists from around the world has
recently begun. They were nominated by
national authorities and are led by an
elected chair who assessed the handling of
the 1976 swine influenza event among US
military personnel at Fort Dix [9]. Here
we offer some initial reflections on the first
12 months of the present pandemic.
Surveillance
Considerable effort in recent years had
been dedicated to preparing for surveillance
during a pandemic and to incorporating
modelling in planning in some countries.
The pandemic virus was detected and
isolated reasonably early, although too late
for any attempt at containment. It remains
unclear precisely when or where it first
emerged, but the earliest human infections
were detected in North America and the
best estimates of the timing of emergence are
variously mid-February from field epidemi-
ology in southeast Mexico or mid-January
from a molecular clock model [10]. Situa-
tional awareness during the early phase
allowed quick assessment by countries,
notably those affected first (Mexico, US,
Canada, and Southern hemisphere temper-
ate countries). The integration of clinical,
laboratory, and epidemiologic data proved
essential and gave important insights into
disease severity, transmission dynamics, and
anticipated impact of interventions. Focused
local or national studies with analyses shared
through WHO or regional bodies proved
more valuable than relying on collection of
primary data for analysis in some regions
[2]. Although there were modelling efforts
underway, only a few governments incor-
porated such data for policy decisions.
Seroepidemiology
Data from seroepidemiological studies
have been limited, primarily due to the
lack of routine influenza serosurveys, and
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technical challenges with the assays, inter-
pretation, and validation of results. Avail-
able serological data on prevalence or
seroincidence of humoral immunity yield-
ed age-specific attack rates that indicated a
substantial proportion of asymptomatic
infections and mild illnesses, similar to or
greater than past pandemics and seasonal
outbreaks. This was confirmed by a recent
Hong Kong study showing the proportion
of asymptomatic infection, secondary at-
tack rates, viral shedding, and course of
illness among household members were
largely similar between infections with
seasonal and pandemic influenza virus
strains circulating during 2009 [11]. The
few published serosurveys revealed hetero-
geneities in infection rates among different
groups and between different places
[12–14]. In particular there appears to
be serological evidence of substantial
preexisting humoral immunity among
older adults, ranging from 23% (1:32 titre
by haemagglutination inhibition in those
65 years or over) [14] to 34% (1:80 titre by
microneutralisation assay in those 60 years
or over) [15] in different studies. Further
data on population susceptibility by age or
the availability of a rapid and accurate
serological test could allow health services
to further target vaccine efforts for subse-
quent waves, as has been done in a few
countries [14].
Nonpharmaceutical
Interventions
Early on, some airports installed ther-
mal screening and others asked travellers
to declare fever or respiratory symptoms at
disembarkation. The utility of these inter-
ventions has been repeatedly challenged
[16], although if executed well could delay
the start of community transmission by a
few weeks [15,17] (Table 2). Similarly,
during the early stages of global or local
spread, quarantine, isolation, school clo-
sures, and other social distancing measures
were variously implemented in some
populations (e.g., Mexico [18], western
Japan [19], UK), although most have not
yet been formally evaluated and published
[20]. Two exceptions are in Hong Kong
and the UK. In the former, it was
estimated that transmission fell by 25%
when schools closed [21]. In settings like
Hong Kong, with the infrastructure and
resources to implement such measures and
Summary Points
N Many of the initial responses to the 2009 H1N1 pandemic went well but there
are many lessons to learn for future pandemic planning.
N Clear communication of public health messages is crucial, and should not
confuse what could happen (and should be prepared for) with what is most
likely to happen.
N Decisions regarding pandemic response during the exigencies of a public
health emergency must be judged according to the best evidence available at
the time.
N Revising pandemic plans—to be more flexible and more detailed—should wait
for WHO leadership if national plans are not to diverge. Surveillance beyond
influenza should be stepped up, and contingencies drawn up for the
emergence or re-emergence of other novel and known pathogens.
N Data collection and sharing are paramount, and include epidemiological and
immunological data. Clinical management of severe influenza disease should
not be limited to the current antiviral regimen, and include the development of
other therapeutics (e.g., novel antivirals and immunotherapy).
N Greater and more timely access to antivirals and influenza vaccines worldwide
remains an ongoing challenge.
Table 1. What has occurred in this pandemic and what could have been worse.
What Has Occurred to Date What Could Have Been Worse
A pandemic virus strain was first detected in North America Emergence in a less developed setting
Immediate virus sharing following virus isolation to promote rapid development
and deployment of available diagnostics and vaccine candidates
Delayed virus sharing
Apparent lower global impact in terms of disease severity on an overall population
basis (i.e., all ages) compared to other pandemics (e.g., 1918 H1N1 virus), and to
what was feared (e.g., HPAI H5N1 virus)
A more pathogenic pandemic virus, or rapid evolution of more
virulent circulating strains
Residual immunity among a proportion of the population (i.e., older adults) Total population susceptibility
Circulating pandemic virus strains susceptible to neuraminidase inhibitor antivirals
stockpiled for pandemic planning and available in some countries
Widespread neuraminidase inhibitor resistance in circulating strains;
no antiviral medications available
Rapid dissemination of epidemiological, clinical, and virological data from North
America and the Southern Hemisphere to inform the global community
Poor or incomplete data, or lack of transparency and information
sharing
Emergence during the end of a seasonal influenza epidemic Emergence during the peak of a seasonal influenza epidemic to
complicate disease and virus identification and increase pressures on
health services
Mild uncomplicated illness in most people with pandemic influenza virus infection A more pathogenic virus causing a high frequency of severe
complications
Basic reproductive number (Ro) on a similar scale to seasonal influenza virus transmission A higher Ro
Modes of transmission similar to seasonal influenza A and B virus spread Different modes of transmission (e.g., substantial contact/fomites
transmission, conjunctival/ocular infection)
A vaccine that is highly immunogenic usually requiring only a single injection Poor immunogenicity and requiring multiple injections
A vaccine that appears to be safe and with similar safety profile to seasonal
influenza vaccine, with very low frequency of severe complications
Frequent and severe vaccine-associated adverse events
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000346.t001
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a populace sensitised by the 1997 H5N1
and 2003 SARS experiences, not carrying
out border screening and social distancing
would have been untenable. It had been
felt that containment of a pandemic would
be ineffective except perhaps during Phase
4 (WHO definition) [22] but some coun-
tries attempted containment in Phases 5
and 6. Some countries even instituted a
‘‘containment phase’’ using case-finding
and various measures such as isolation and
antiviral treatment of ill suspected and
confirmed cases, and quarantine of ex-
posed persons with or without antiviral
chemoprophylaxis, while others never
attempted or quickly moved from re-
source-intensive containment to mitigation
[22]. A preliminary evaluation of intensive
containment undertaken in parts of the
UK during its spring/summer wave of
2009 demonstrates how resource- and
labour-intensive community containment
could have been and also how even with a
lot of resources the measures had to be
abandoned [23]. It is now recognised that
the phrase ‘‘containment’’ was unfortu-
nate and potentially misleading since at
best the actions were only mitigating
impact [24].
This pandemic virus transmitted effi-
ciently among children and at least one
study has shown that school closures were
associated with reduced population trans-
mission when implemented early [21].
Closures appear to have stopped school
outbreaks in western Japan and might have
also mitigated impact initially on the local
communities [25]. However, decisions on
this intervention were contextually specific,
dependent on feasibility and their potential
downsides [26]. In Europe and the US the
judgement was generally that proactive
school closures would not be justified as a
community mitigation intervention in the
context of a perceived mild-to-moderate
pandemic among the general population,
and reserve plans for widespread closure
have not been activated in most jurisdic-
tions. However, local decisions were made
to close schools in some areas as a response
to prevent transmission and high attack
rates among schoolchildren or simply
where there was too much illness and
absenteeism to sustain teaching [21,27].
Personal protective interventions such
as face masks, hand hygiene, and early
isolation may have been beneficial in
reducing transmission at the individual
level in the home [27,28], although
household secondary attack rates during
the pandemic were similar to those with
seasonal influenza [13,29]. Their popula-
tion level impact remains to be assessed.
There was much debate over whether to
use conventional masks or respirators in
health care settings. One well-conducted
Canadian trial on seasonal influenza virus
transmission published during the pan-
demic suggested no additional advantage
from N95 respirators [30].
Antivirals
Oseltamivir and zanamivir (and later
peramivir in some countries) played a role
in the mitigation effort, sometimes draw-
ing on national stockpiles. Except for
Japan, widespread use of antivirals had
not been the norm previously. It became
standard to recommend neuraminidase
inhibitors for treatment of inpatients and
high-risk outpatients, and in restricted
circumstances for chemoprophylaxis. In-
novative delivery schemes were sometimes
developed. Those who fell sick in England
could have a telephone assessment (taking
pressure off primary care) and then if
appropriate receive empiric oseltamivir
treatment from a local pharmacist. In
Norway oseltamivir was made available
‘‘over the counter.’’ However in many
European settings, reluctance remained
among primary care providers to prescribe
a drug they were unused to. Another
controversy was whether to offer oselta-
mivir to all those with symptoms or target
those at higher risk for complications. The
observational data so far suggest that early
treatment with neuraminidase inhibitors
have worked to reduce severe disease and
have not been linked to significant adverse
risks [31,32]. Late clinical presentation
and delayed initiation of antiviral treat-
ment have been implicated with more
severe complications worldwide, indicat-
ing gaps in identifying and treating
patients before disease severity increases.
While sporadic cases of oseltamivir resis-
tance have been reported in association
with a specific mutation (H275Y in
neuraminidase), such oseltamivir-resistant
viruses have rarely transmitted [3]. In-
deed, the pandemic virus has remained
genetically and antigenically stable so far.
Vaccines
The core pharmaceutical preventive
intervention was vaccines and this has
Box 1. A Series of ‘‘Firsts’’ about Pandemic (H1N1) 2009
N The first pandemic to emerge in the twenty-first century. It has been more
widespread and remains ongoing, compared to SARS.
N The first pandemic to occur after major global investments in pandemic
preparedness had been initiated.
N The first pandemic for which effective vaccines and antivirals were widely
available in many countries, thus requiring public health authorities to earn and
retain the confidence of health care providers through whom such are usually
distributed.
N The first influenza pandemic to coincide with the ongoing HIV/AIDS pandemic
and for which preliminary data do not suggest a substantial, disproportionate
impact on HIV-infected patients.
N The first pandemic that took place within the context of a set of International
Health Regulations and global governance, which had not been widely tested
until the present.
N The first pandemic with early diagnostic tests that led to rapid diagnosis but
also an early obsession in the media and of policymakers with having reports of
the numbers of those infected.
N The first pandemic with antivirals available in many countries that led to a
hopeful expectation that the pandemic might be containable, leading to the
preparation for and implementation of a ‘‘containment phase’’ in some places.
N The first pandemic in which intensive care was available in many countries to
treat critically ill patients, fostering an expectation that everyone could be
treated and cured.
N The first pandemic with instant communication so that early impressions (such
as the experience and response in Mexico and the Ukraine) could be shared
ahead of proper scientific analysis.
N The first pandemic in which web-based platforms of traditional journals expedit-
ed dissemination, complemented by other innovative online resources (e.g. PLoS
Currents: Influenza, http://knol.google.com/k/plos-currents-influenza#, based on
Google’s knol technology).
N The first pandemic with a ‘‘blogosphere’’ and other rapid social media
messaging tools that challenged conventional public health communication.
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been a particular focus for critics citing the
uneven and suboptimal uptake across
countries. Development of a pandemic
vaccine was a scientific success, but limited
availability until after the autumn/winter
wave had nearly peaked in the Northern
Hemisphere contributed to lower coverage
than anticipated [33]. Vaccination cover-
age depended on many factors, including
availability, preordering, licensing and
bureaucratic hurdles, logistics, conve-
nience, and, most crucially, public and
professional perceptions. This pandemic
presented a particular risk communication
challenge, since while infection usually
results in mild illness, occasionally it is
lethal, even in the young and previously
healthy despite optimal treatment [34–36].
In the absence of any excess risk of serious
side effects compared to annual seasonal
vaccines [37] (despite the intensive effort
to look for such) the benefits of immuni-
sation far outweighed any potential down-
sides at the individual level, particularly
for those at higher risk for complications.
Notwithstanding such evidence, the cost of
pandemic vaccines was considerable and a
loss of public confidence has sometimes
been triggered by unsubstantiated media
reports of serious side effects with a ‘‘new
vaccine’’ that utilised the same manufac-
turing technology as for years of seasonal
vaccines. Uptake among health care
providers as role models has been mixed,
as has their expression of the need for
vaccination at all. This sometimes cast
doubt in the minds of the public. Con-
versely, pandemic deaths in young healthy
people abruptly changed public percep-
tion (such as in Canada, Romania, and
Finland); supply and organisational issues
then became crucial.
Another more fundamental criticism
challenges whether vaccines should have
been procured at all given an eventual
surplus in the developed North. The
unexpected finding that a single dose was
immunogenic among all persons except
for younger children, which reduced the
required number of doses by half from the
projected number needed in most coun-
tries, but this was not known in advance of
countries placing vaccine orders. Had
there been ‘‘overpreparation’’? The prior
worry had been the reverse – would there
be sufficient production capacity to meet
needs [38]? Even in retrospect, and with
the observed burden of the pandemic, a
vaccine was clearly justified for countries
where annual vaccines for seasonal influ-
enza are routinely recommended.
Field and pharmacovigilance data so far
have shown that these vaccines were
immunogenic, effective, and very safe
[39]. However, the frailty was timing and
availability. Generally supplies came in
later and in smaller amounts than fore-
casted, in part due to lower yield in growth
of the vaccine virus strain than expected.
Table 2. Objectives and limitations of public health interventions in pandemic (H1N1) 2009.
Intervention
Objective – What It Was
Intended For
What It Cannot Do
or Was Not Intended
to Achieve Notes
Populations That Implemented
the Intervention
Nonpharmaceutical
Border measures:
screening, quarantine,
and isolation
Reduce and delay
community spread somewhat
at the earliest stage to allow
better preparation for mitigation
response [15]
Completely prevent
entry of infected
individuals due to
suboptimal sensitivity
and asymptomatic
(including infected and
within incubation
period) or subclinical
presentation [16]
Many countries did not attempt
these measures because of
logistics, stage of pandemic [22]
or other cost-benefit
considerations [16]
China
Hong Kong SAR
Japan
Personal protective
measures (e.g., face
masks, hand hygiene,
cough etiquette, early
self-isolation when ill)
Reduce risk of infection to
self and close contacts
(if self is ill and infected)
[27,28]
Have not been
evaluated whether
they can provide
significant population-
level protection
Virtually all countries
implemented these measures
to varying degrees in health care
settings according to the risk
of the situation. Almost all
encouraged hand hygiene,
cough etiquette, and early
self-isolation
Most countries recommended
adoption of hand hygiene, cough
etiquette, and early self-isolation
when ill, but use of face masks in the
community was uncommon except
in East Asia.
Pharmaceutical
Antivirals for treatment
and chemoprophylaxis
[21,22]
Mitigation: reduce illness
severity and complications if
administered early; reduce
transmission from those
receiving treatment; sometimes
also used as chemoprophylaxis
in high-risk circumstances
Provide significant
population-level
protection or allow
containment
Attempts at source containment
were not possible, as the
pandemic was effectively already
in WHO Phase 5 when what
became the pandemic virus was
first identified [22]. Initial
observational studies suggest
antivirals were successful when
early treatment was administered
Canada
Germany
Hong Kong SAR
Japan
UK
US
(these populations attempted the
intervention initially but effort was
not sustained towards the later
stages of the pandemic)
Vaccines Mitigation
(a) at individual level by
conferring immunity to infection
in those at higher risk of severe
disease or (b) at a population
level by immunizing population
groups especially those who are
transmitting most (i.e., children)
In most countries vaccine was
not available early enough
and/or arrived in insufficiently
large amounts to achieve
mitigation at a population
level. Greater population
benefit may occur in the next
season
Most countries of the developed
North, especially those with advance
purchase agreements
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000346.t002
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Most of the orders arrived after the peak of
the autumn/winter wave in the geograph-
ic north (whose countries had received
most vaccines). Therefore, judgement on
their impact in averting serious morbidity
and deaths may come only after the
second winter. Perhaps then, differential
use by countries will allow for comparisons
where there is good surveillance for severe
disease and deaths.
There have been claims of extraneous
influence on the independent and objec-
tive judgment of expert advice that in
turn influenced decision-making [40].
These claims have been robustly coun-
tered as they relate to WHO’s advisory
and decision-making process [41]. As
Harvey Fineberg, chair of WHO’s ex-
ternal review, pointed out, when assess-
ing any allegations of impropriety or
bias, or the perception of such, it would
be important to distinguish between
financial or other conflicts with potential
pecuniary gains versus predispositions
arising from an individual’s background
and experience. Rather than aiming for
a complete purge of any and all experts
who had worked with vaccine manufac-
turers and received sponsorship, as these
are often the very same group who
possess the most relevant and useful
expertise precisely because they have
been closely involved in the research
and development process, the focus
should be on making the declaration of
such interest wholly transparent and
comprehensive according to a set of
robustly established procedures that can
withstand the strictest scrutiny. It is
reassuring that WHO has honoured its
commitment to making public the names
and declarations of interest of the
pandemic Emergency Committee when
the pandemic was declared over on 10
August 2010. Additionally, receiving
advice should be differentiated from
making decisions. The people entrusted
with undertaking the latter task should
then judge the validity of the advice
rendered by experts, having taken into
account their interest declarations. The
decision makers should also be prepared
to justify their actions.
Looking Forward
It is important to learn from our
experience through the first year and
beyond as we move into the new seasonal
influenza [42,43]. It is theoretically possi-
ble, although unlikely, that the second
winter of this pandemic will be worse than
the first, as happened for the 1968
pandemic when transmissibility increased
[44]. Equally, if the pandemic virus out-
competed the A(H3N2) virus strains re-
sponsible for more intense seasonal epi-
demics, there may even be a diminution of
disease burden in older people. As of this
writing, seasonal influenza A (H3N2) and
B virus strains continue to cocirculate.
Antigenic drift in the 2009 H1N1 virus is
expected to occur in the future, especially
under the pressure of so many people now
being immune through infection or im-
munisation, although the timing is unpre-
dictable. The pandemic virus is included
in the trivalent seasonal influenza vaccine
composition for both hemispheres. Clear
communication of public health messages
will remain a particular challenge and not
confusing what could happen (and should
be prepared for) with what is most likely to
happen. In assessing the pandemic re-
sponse, decisions made during the exigen-
cies of a public health emergency must be
judged according to the best evidence
available at the time. Hindsight always
gives perfect vision and using post-hoc
information to evaluate prior decisions at
best confuses and often produces unfair
conclusions.
Preparedness plans will have to be
revised in due time, after the many lessons
learned have been gathered. This should
be done quickly in case the worst is not yet
over [45]. However, rewriting plans
should best wait for WHO leadership if
national plans are not to diverge. A strong
argument exists for making future plans
more flexible and having extra descrip-
tions including the many aspects of
severity when a pandemic is emerging
that then determine the consequential
public health actions [2]. Broadening
surveillance for a range of influenza A
viruses among a wide range of animals
(e.g., swine), not just in avian species, as
well as strengthening the monitoring of
seasonal influenza virus infections in
humans will facilitate identification of
novel influenza A viruses of pandemic
potential, and earlier detection of the
emergence of a pandemic virus. More
broadly we should look beyond influenza
and draw up contingencies for the emer-
gence or re-emergence of other novel and
known pathogens [45].
One challenge faced initially in this
pandemic was for timely collection and
sharing of clinical data to inform optimal
management of critically ill patients
worldwide. Establishing clinical research
infrastructure prior to a pandemic and a
central institutional review board will
facilitate data collection and analyses
[46], whether for the next influenza
pandemic, SARS outbreak, or next
novel respiratory pathogen of global
importance. Clinical management of
severe influenza disease should not be
limited to the current antiviral regimen,
and include the development of other
therapeutics (e.g., novel antivirals and
immunotherapy).
Ongoing improvements in the routine
and timely monitoring of hospital admis-
sions and deaths attributable to influenza,
as well as representative serological sur-
veys at regular intervals can provide
epidemiological data with which to reduce
uncertainty around the true burden of
influenza and thus inform policy choices
[47].
Assessment of the humoral and cellular
immune response over time in a subset of
vaccinated individuals could reveal how
vaccine-induced immunity differs from
natural infection, and whether cross-reac-
tive responses to other influenza virus
strains are modulated by the two types of
immunological response [48]. The latter
could become important as the pandemic
strain has already been cocirculating with
other interpandemic influenza A virus
strains in some parts of the world.
Greater access to antivirals and influ-
enza vaccines worldwide is an ongoing
challenge. Although WHO secured
pledges of 200 million vaccine doses
and monies for operations, and more
than 80 less-resourced countries have
signed agreements with WHO for supply
of vaccines, this gap remains. It is an
indefensible fact that these vaccines
started to flow to the poorer countries
well after they began going to the
countries with advance purchase ar-
rangements. Delivering timely pandemic
influenza vaccination in countries with-
out existing seasonal vaccine pro-
grammes is proving difficult. The long-
term solution has to be improved sur-
veillance, expanded monitoring of dis-
ease burden, and better prevention and
control of influenza, including the de-
velopment of seasonal vaccine use and
production in all regions of the world
[49]. Increased coverage of available
bacterial vaccines (Hib, pneumococcal)
will help prevent secondary invasive
bacterial coinfections with either season-
al or pandemic influenza.
Finally accusations of ‘‘overreaction’’
can be countered by the observation that
investment in fire services or insurance is
usually judged against their ability to
respond to conflagrations. If the first test
is a lesser fire, that experience should be
used for improvements rather than as a
reason to scrap the fire engines and cancel
the insurance [40].
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